An intellectual and philosophical analysis of reality by Michael and Brian Surkan
20 February 2009
Love it or hate it, bank nationalization is inevitable
Sure, it’s theoretically possible that the government would just stand by and allow a Citigroup to keel over, and wind up being liquidated in a bankruptcy, but policy makers would never allow such a disorderly crash. Show me just one congressman (other than Ron Paul) who would be willing to allow all the depositors in Wells Fargo to lose their savings?
Instead, the government will be forced to step in and supervise an orderly dissolution, much as what occurs with FDIC conservatorships. I find it strange to hear so many critics about nationalization when nary a complaint is uttered when the FDIC seizes lenders and proceeds to find buyers, and disposal of assets. That’s all we’re talking about here. The only difference is that the big banks are of an order of scale larger than anything the FDIC has hitherto dealt with, potentially saddling the government with enormous liabilities as they pick up the pieces.
Of course, I personally favour the hands-off approach, allowing depositors to be completely wiped out (this would definitely stop any moral hazard in its tracks, when everyone realizes they have to take personal responsibility for putting their money in safe institutions), but I know it will never happen.
Sooner or later the federal government will be forced, kicking and screaming, to seize the nation’s big banks. I am sure this is not what Messr Geithner would like to do, but he won’t have any choice. Unfortunately, judging by the collapse in bank share prices it looks like this will happen sooner than later. As we’ve already seen in many other bank failures over the last year, depositors start to withdraw their money when their bank’s stocks are in the sub $5 range, which creates a dynamic that drives the institution into the ground.
We’re all Keynsians now
The Frontline documentary on the crash of 2008 also plays right into this general belief that running the economy is all just a matter of good, level-headed, policy making. The documentary infers that the financial crisis could have been stopped in its tracks if only policy makers had used a more comprehensive approach early on, and appeared more confident.
Of course, I can understand the natural desire we all have for hope. We also don’t like to think that events are out of control. It is far more comforting to believe that the only reason bad things happen is because some person’s incompetence, or mistake, than to consider that there was nothing anyone could have done.
But now is not a time to ask such questions. Instead, everyone ought to just be greatfull that our governments care, and are trying to do something to fix the economy. After all, it’s the thought that counts.
18 February 2009
Canadian economy bites the dust
So much for the theory that Canada's economy was going to go right on sailing the high seas when the US tanked. Yet another nail in the coffin of the de-coupling theory. If anything, the bubble in Canadian real-estate has been even more spectacularly insane than that of our neighbours to the south.
As I've said for a long time, the economic fall-out from the global credit bubble is going to be far worse in most other nations than in the US.
Economic problems in the U.S. have always been keenly felt in Canada. But
until last fall, Canada looked positioned to weather the storm better than its
southern neighbor. Low corporate and consumer debt levels, no subprime-mortgage
crisis, and surpluses in the federal budget and trade balance placed it on
sounder footing. Economists expected slower growth but no recession.Last fall, as economic problems multiplied in the U.S. and elsewhere in
Canada, Alberta's oil-and-gas industry briefly remained a bright spot. Then the
bottom dropped out of the oil market, as the global downturn suppressed demand.
Tightening credit compounded the problem. Almost overnight, oil companies
started postponing investment plans.Rick George, the chief executive of Calgary-based Suncor, which in January
postponed site-expansion work worth C$14 billion, estimates that 35,000
temporary workers employed around the Fort McMurray oil sands will be reduced to
fewer than 10,000 by the end of the year. Given how frenetic the boom was, he
says, "we needed a correction. What we didn't need is a collapse in the banking
system and the world economy to get it."
12 February 2009
financial bail-outs just add to deflationary pressures
I guess the new US administration hasn’t heard about the Hippocratic oath.
In the new consumer-lending program, the Treasury provides $100 billion ofhttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB123440381495875583.html?mod=testMod
capital and the Fed uses that as a cushion against which it could make up to $1
trillion of three-year loans aimed at jump-starting markets and spurring
consumer lending.
08 February 2009
Economic Crises Stimulate Community and Interdependence
Institutional Instincts Deepen Crises
At the national level, officials move towards protectionism when their intent is to expand trade and economic activity. Protectionism, including "buy American" policies, reduces trade and production by inducing trading partners to restrict our goods from entering their markets.
Governments also try to encourage easy credit and aggressive consumer spending when those are precisely the reasons for the economic crisis in the first place. The cure for excessive borrowing and spending is saving, but while savings help long term economic growth, they discourage near term consumption.
Individuals and families naturally save more and spend less when they feel that their assets are declining in value or that their sources of income are at risk of decline. The governments are actively discouraging this natural instinct because it means a decline in consumption in the near term which causes declines in perceived economic strength and hence government popularity. Without savings, however, there is less capital available for creating new companies and providing productivity-enhancing capital to workers in the medium to long term.
Because individuals cannot be easily discouraged from saving when they sense economic troubles, governments resort to taking the money individuals invest in government bonds and spending it for them. Instead of these savings going into the most productive industries and investments, it is turned into government make-work projects like bailing out poorly run companies and inefficiently building unneeded infrastructure projects. In short, these savings are diverted from achieving their natural role of encouraging long-term economic growth into short-term make-work projects.
The same short-sighted mistakes are made at the institutional level. Rather than simply reducing spending and production, organizations often choose to provide a lower quality product, thus diminishing their reputation and hurting their long-term growth. This is especially true of service organizations like private schools and colleges where it can seem more attractive to accept lower quality applicants who can pay full tuition than it is to offer scholarships or simply lower tuition so as to enable more high quality students to be able to attend. This latter requires some belt tightening, but it ensures that the quality of the product is maintained or even raised. Above all, customers demand value for their investment during crises. Schools and similar service-based organizations need to both reduce their prices and raise their quality.
Whereas the individual instincts to save money and look for better value during crises are very healthy, institutions and governments with short term economic objectives tend to make decisions which seem to be compelling in the short term, but which ultimately diminish the health of the country or organization. The role of crises is to improve value and savings, and resistance these ends will only protract and deepen the economic suffering.